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Abstract 
In this paper, we study the pricing strategies in the discrete time single bottleneck model with general heterogeneous commuters.  We first 
prove that in the system optimal assignment, the queue time must be zero for all the departures.  Based on this result, the system optimal problem 
is formulated as a linear program.  The solution existence and uniqueness are discussed.  Applying linear programming duality, we then prove 
that the optimal dual variable values provide an optimal toll with which the system optimal solution is also an equilibrium solution.  Extensive 
computational results are reported to demonstrate the insights gained from the formulations presented in this paper.  These results confirm that a 
system optimal equilibrium can be found using the proposed approach. 
¤2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
The single bottleneck (SB) model is a simplification of the morning rush hour congestion in which a fixed 
number of commuters pass a route segment with a fixed capacity (the bottleneck).  In addition, the commuters have 
their own preferred arrival times and cost functions.  They pay a queue time cost proportional to the time they spend 
in the queue as well as a schedule delay cost if they arrive earlier or later than their preferred arrival time.  By 
choosing the specific departure times, the commuters maximize their utility by determining the trade-off between 
travel time (TT) and schedule delay (SCD).  The seminal work of Vickrey (1969) provided a foundation for 
understanding the rate of departures in the SB model.  Since then, there have been many studies that explored 
different variants of this model.  Before providing a comprehensive literature review, we first discuss some notions 
used in the single bottleneck models. 
User equilibrium (UE), which is sometimes referred to as the no-toll user equilibrium (Arnott et al, 1993, 1994), 
is an assignment in which no driver can reduce his/her cost by changing the arrival time unilaterally (Smith, 1984).  
On the other hand, the system optimal usually refers to the traffic assignment in which the total system cost is 
minimized (Alfa, 1986, Arnott et al, 1994), where the total system cost is defined as the sum of the total travel time 
cost and the total schedule delay cost of all the departures.  In some of the previous studies (Arnott et al, 1988, 1993, 
1994), the term system optimal was used to refer to both minimum cost assignment without toll and the minimum 
cost assignment with optimal toll.  In order to differentiate these two concepts, we use the term system optimal (SO) 
to refer to the former one, namely, optimal assignment without any pricing tolls.  The term system optimal 
equilibrium (SOE), borrowed from (Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981), is used to refer to the latter one, optimal 
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assignment with optimal toll.  More specifically, in an SOE, the total system cost, excluding the toll revenue, is 
minimized while the equilibrium conditions under the toll pricing strategy are satisfied simultaneously.  The toll 
which ensures that an SO is also an SOE is called the optimal toll based on the given SO.  
The user equilibrium problem in the SB model has been studied extensively in the literature. Hendrickson and 
Kocur (1981) and Arnott et al (1993) refined the model of Vickrey (1969) and proposed a continuous time model to 
address the user equilibrium problem.  Under a different assumption of variable arrival curve, Smith (1984) and 
Daganzo (1985) showed the existence and uniqueness of time-dependent departure rate satisfying user equilibrium 
conditions. These models also considered the broader class of penalty functions.  Ramadurai and Ukkusuri (2006) 
showed theoretically that Wardropian user equilibrium does not exist in the SB model when the players are 
considered as atomic.  Mun (1999) analyzed the SB problem with traffic properties such as speed, density, and 
length of queue which lead to a more realistic traffic flow model. Most of the above studies only focus on the 
homogeneous case, namely, the case where all the commuters have the same desired arrival time and units cost of 
late and early arrival.  
In the heterogeneous SB model, different groups of travellers have different cost functions and different preferred 
arrival times.  As mentioned in Arnott et al (1993), the heterogeneous SB model is not a straight-forward extension 
of the homogeneous one.  There are some studies that explored the solution procedures for the heterogeneous model 
such as Newell (1997), Arnott et al (1989), Lindsey (2004), Liu and Nie (2010), and Ramadurai et al (2010).  
Newell (1987), using a similar model as in Daganzo (1985), considered the concept of variable arrival time.  The 
solution was obtained by a graphical method.  Arnott et al (1989, 1994) provided the equilibrium conditions for a 
few particular heterogeneity: commuters with the same preferred arrival time and the same ratio of late arrival 
schedule delay to early arrival schedule delay, commuters with same preferred arrival time, travel cost, early arrival 
cost but different late arrival cost, and commuters with same cost functions but different preferred arrival time.  
Lindsey (2004), using the continuous time model, analytically showed that the equilibrium in the SB model with 
heterogeneous commuters always exists.  Liu and Nie (2010) expanded the continuous SB model to incorporate 
route choices in a network of two routes. The heterogeneity is restricted to that case of two specific groups with 
identical preferred arrival time.  Ramadurai (2009) and Ramadurai et al (2010) developed a linear complementarity 
(LCP) formulation for the SB model under both homogeneity and heterogeneity assumptions.  In the discrete time 
setting, the proposed LCP formulation represents the first known analytical formulation for the SB model 
accounting for the general heterogeneity in user classes.  The solution existence and uniqueness were theoretically 
proven for both the homogeneous and the heterogeneous cases.  The formulation was also shown to allow for 
efficient computation of equilibrium solutions.  
Since the SOE provides an efficient, stable, and fair use of the single bottleneck, it has also been a focus of the 
literature.  Vickrey (1969), Hendrickson and Kocur (1981), Arnott et al (1988) showed that the proper pricing 
structures can eliminate queue delay and hence lead to efficient use of the SB in rush hours.  Arnott et al (1993) 
proposed a set of pricing regimes including the uniform toll, coarse toll, and fine toll to study the SOE conditions.  
This study confirmed that the SOE can be obtained using the fine toll.  In addition, the coarse toll is better than the 
uniform toll but worse than the fine toll.  Arnott et al (1994) considered the SO and welfare in three special cases: 1) 
commuters with different travel time penalty (α) and early penalty (β), same ratio of late penalty to early penalty 
(γ/β), 2) commuters with different late penalties γ, and 3) commuters with different preferred arrival time (t*). Laih 
(1994) studied the multiple step tolls for general SB model with homogeneous commuters. This study showed that at 
most n/(n+1) of the total travel time can be eliminated with the n-step toll.  Daganzo and Garcia (2000) used time-
dependent toll in which some of commuters are exempted from paying tolls.  The paying commuters can avoid toll 
if they depart outside of the time window.  The paper claimed that up to 25% of total user cost can be eliminated.  
Newell (1987) discussed time-dependent tolls for the heterogeneous case.  The toll cT(t) is determined only by the 
commuters who value schedule delay cost the least or the most.  This study, however, did not derive a concrete 
result for toll strategies.  Yang and Huang (2005) reviewed some previous studies on dynamic pricing for single 
bottleneck, parallel bottleneck, and bi-modal single bottleneck with a transit mode.  The pricing schemes can reduce 
the total system cost and eliminate queue.  However this discussion focused on the case with only two groups of departures. 
Although there are some approaches to solve the SOE problem appeared in the literature, these existing 
approaches are limited to the homogeneous case or special heterogeneous cases.  The method from Hendrickson and 
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Kocur (1981), Arnott et al (1993) is applicable only to the homogeneous case under the continuous time setting.  In 
this method, the SO departures are assigned to depart at the corresponding arrival time of the UE problem so as to 
eliminate the queue and obtain similar schedule delay cost.  Arnott et al (1994) considered some specific 
heterogeneous cases.  In this study, the SO solution is obtained by assigning groups with different absolute schedule 
delay cost in to the capacity pattern.  Then the toll is estimated to ensure the SO to be an SOE.  Another approach is 
to solve the SOE by the SO objective function with the UE constraints (Jahn et al, 2005).  Although this study does 
not consider single bottleneck model, the idea of constrained system optimal may lead to an SOE solution that is fair 
and efficient for the whole system. 
Motivated by the above limitations, we develop a comprehensive method to study the pricing problem in the SB 
model with general user heterogeneity in discrete time setting.  The primary reason for considering the discrete time 
setting is the tractability of the mathematical articulation using tools such as linear programming and linear 
complementarity problems which enable rigorous analysis. We are devoted to developing a rigorous SO formulation 
for the heterogeneous single bottleneck model with the general heterogeneity assumptions.  The solution of this 
formulation will guarantee efficient capacity utilization.  In addition, in order to ensure a stable solution and the 
fairness from the drivers’ perspective, an optimal toll strategy will be developed.  Our study represents the first work 
that can deal with the general user heterogeneity.  In particular, the contributions of this paper are briefly listed as follows:  
(1) A rigorous proof for no-queue time property in SO is provided, 
(2) An analytical formulation with general heterogeneity parameters to find the SO assignment is proposed,  
(3) The existence and some properties of the SO solution are explored, 
(4) The relationship between the optimal toll and the optimal dual variable values is revealed, 
(5) Two necessary conditions for multiple optimal tolls are proved.  A heuristic approach to find the optimal tolls 
based on the necessary conditions and the UE formulation with toll is studied. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Following the introduction and motivation section, Section 2 
includes problem definition and preliminaries.  Section 3 focuses on the no-queue-time property of the SO solution.  
Based on the results proved in Section 3, Section 4 develops a linear programming formulation for the system 
optimal problem.  Section 5 is devoted to the existence of the optimal toll strategy.  The numerical results are 
presented in Section 6.  The conclusions are provided in the last section.   
2. Problem Definition and Preliminaries 
In this research, we consider the situation where N departures need to traverse a road link with capacity s on a discrete 
time horizon with T+1 time intervals indexed by t = 0,...,T.  The departures are classified into G groups indexed by g = 
1,...,G with a desired arrival time ݐ௚כ associated with each group g.  Departures in group g have the same unit costs of the 
time spent in queue, being earlier than the desired arrival time, and being later than the desired arrival time.   
The notations used in this work are shown below: 
t: index for time interval, t = 0,...,T. The unit of t can be second or minute. 
ݐ௚כ: preferred arrival time of group g.  
ߙ௚: travel time penalty of group g in the queue.  
ߚ௚: schedule delay penalty of group g if it arrives earlier than the preferred arrival time 
ߛ௚: schedule delay penalty of group g if it arrives later than the preferred arrival time 
The unit of ߙ௚, ߚ௚, ߛ௚ can be $/time interval/vehicle. 
௚ܰ: number of departures of group g;  
N: total number of departures; 
s: capacity of single bottleneck. Unit: vehicles/time interval. 
rt,g: departure rate of group g at time t. Unit: vehicles/ time interval. 
TTt: travel time of the departures departing at time t. Unit: time interval. 
et g: early schedule delay of the departures of group g departing at time t. Unit: time interval. 
lt,g: late schedule delay of the departures of group g departing at time t. Unit: time interval. 
SCDt,g: schedule delay of the departures of group g departing at time t. Unit: time interval. 
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We assume that g g gJ D E! !  for each group g, and * , ,g gt N s  > 0.  
We consider the problem of assigning these N departures to the T+1 time intervals.  According to Wardrop’s two 
principles, we consider both the user equilibrium assignment and the system optimal assignment.  Mathematically, 
an assignment can be represented by (rt g)t=0,...T;g=1,...,G, i.e, number of departures in group g in each time interval t.  In 
the homogeneous case, this can be represented by (rt)t=0,...,T, i.e, number of departures in each time interval t in the 
homogeneous case. 
It is assumed that the free flow travel time from home to the bottleneck and from the bottleneck to work places is 
zero.  Let tTT , so-called travel time at time t, be the queuing time of departures departing at time interval t.  In this 
study, we use the terms “travel time” and “queue time” interchangeably.  At the beginning of the peak hours, the 
queue is built up if the total departure rate is greater than the capacity.  At the end of the peak hours, the queue is 
cleared.  Given an assignment, the travel time TTt, arrival time at, and schedule delay et,g, lt,g are estimated as follows 
(Ramadurai et al, 2010): 
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Notice that in any assignments, we require that all the departures arrive by time T, i.e, ta Td for all t such that rt,g 
> 0. In (1) and (2), if the sum of departures is greater than capacity s, the queue is built up.  If the sum of departures 
is less than the capacity, the queue is gradually cleared.  Travel time function TTt is a recursive function of TTt-1.  In 
the appendix, we show the consistency between the discrete-time SB model and the continuous-time SB model 
appeared in the literature.  
3. System Optimal and Zero Travel Time 
In this section we consider the existence of queue time in the SO and SOE.  In the previous studies (Hendrickson 
and Kocur, 1981, Arnott at el, 1993, 1994, Laih, 1994), it is shown that the queue is completely eliminated in SOE.  
In particular, by re-assigning the departure pattern to the arrival pattern, the queue time no longer exists, and the 
total SO cost reduces to the total schedule delay cost  (Figure 1a).  Arnott et al (1994) claimed that in the SO, there 
is no queue, and hence no queue time.  The groups are assigned to incur a minimum system cost which is equal to 
total SCD cost.  However, these studies considered the continuous time setting with only homogeneous commuters 
or some special cases of heterogeneity.  To the best of our knowledge, there is no conclusion for the general 
heterogeneous case.  Moreover, when we move from the continuous time setting to the discrete time setting, the 
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arguments appeared in the literature do not apply directly. One has to carefully deal with several cases to ensure the 
completeness of the proof. Nevertheless, the discrete time setting does allow us to perform a rigorous analysis and 
draw an affirmative conclusion for the general heterogeneous case. 
Based on the discrete time model in Ramadurai et al (2010), our goal is to show that in the optimal assignment 
the queue time does not exist for any of the departures.  Specifically, given an arbitrary assignment, if the travel time 
is strictly positive for some departures, the departure time pattern is different from the arrival time pattern. By re-
assigning the departure time to the corresponding arrival time of the original assignment, we show that there always 
exists a less cost assignment (Figure 1b).  This result provides the foundation to develop the SO formulation in the 
next section. 
Given an arbitrary assignment (rt,g)t=0,...,T;g=1,...,G, the travel time (TTt)t=0,...,T  can be computed from (1) and (2).  The 
arrival time of all departures departing in time interval t is given by: at = t + TTt.  The arrival time of departures at 
time interval t depends on the total number of departures at t since arrival time is a function of travel time determined by 
(1), (2), and (3).  
We claim that for any assignment in which there exists a TTt > 0 for some t, there exists another assignment such 
that the total system cost is reduced.  By allocating the departures to the arrival pattern, the departure rate is equal to 
the capacity.  We show that none of the departures pays a queue time cost and the benefit gained from avoiding the 
queue time is greater than the additional cost caused by the possible increase of the schedule delay.  
The results for the homogeneous and the heterogeneous cases are given in the following two theorems. 
 
Figure 1  a) Method of eliminating travel time for the continuous time SB model with homogeneous 
commuters; b) Idea to eliminate travel time for the discrete time SB model with heterogeneous commuters  
Theorem 1.  If (rt)t = 0,...,T is an SO assignment of the homogeneous SB model, then the travel time TTt obtained 
from (1) - (2) satisfies TTt = 0  t = 0,...,T.  
Theorem 2. If (rt,g)t=0,...,T;g=1,...,G is an SO assignment of the heterogeneous SB model, then the travel time TTt 
obtained from (1) - (2) satisfies TTt = 0  t = 0,...,T. 
The proof for Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix 8.2.  In the proof, we show that if some departures have to wait 
in queue, then there is always an assignment which eliminates the queue and obtains better system cost.  The proof 
for Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix 8.3.   The idea of the proof for Theorem 2 is similar to Theorem 1.   
4. System Optimal Formulation for the Single Bottleneck Model with Heterogeneous Commuters 
In this section, a linear programming (LP) formulation is proposed to find the best assignment with minimum 
total system cost.  Since we have proved the no-queue-time property of the optimal assignment in Section 3, the 
objective function of this LP formulation (5) only contains the total schedule delay.  There is also a no-queue-time 
constraint (6) in which the total departure rate at each time t is required to be less than or equal to the capacity s.  
The LP formulation is as follows. 
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In the above formulation, constraint (6) guarantees that no queue time is induced, since the number of departures 
at each time interval does not exceed the capacity s.  Constraint (7) expresses the demand satisfaction for each 
group.  Constraint (8) is the non-negativity constraint. 
Since the objective function is to minimize the total schedule delay cost, the group with higher SCD is more 
likely assigned close to its preferred arrival time and the group with smaller SCD is assigned to depart far from its 
preferred arrival time.  The order of groups in SO depends on the absolute values of Eg and Jg.  
a. Properties of the SO formulation 
First, we show that the SO formulation (5) - (8) always has a solution under a mild condition.  
Lemma 1.  Assume that 
1
( 1)
G
g
g
s T N
 
 t¦ , the linear program (5) - (8) has an optimal solution.  
Proof.  A linear program has a solution if and only if it has at least one feasible solution and the objective 
function is bounded.  In the SO formulation (5) to (8), constraints (6), (7), and (8) create a feasible region since 
variable rt g is bounded by 0 and s and the condition ,
0
   1,...,
T
t g g
t
r N g G
 
   ¦  is always satisfied with the 
assumption that T is sufficiently large.  Furthermore, the objective function (5) has the lower bound equal to zero.  
Therefore the formulation (5) to (8) always has a solution.          
We explore the uniqueness of the solution since this has important implications for developing the pricing 
strategies, which is discussed in Section 5 of this paper.  The approach to characterize the uniqueness uses the 
concept of reduced cost.  The reduced cost is the amount by which the objective function improves (decreases for 
the minimization problem) before it would be possible for a corresponding variable to assume a positive value in the 
optimal solution.  It represents the cost for increasing a variable by a small amount, i.e., the first derivative from a 
certain point on the polyhedron that constraints the problem.  The reduced cost ݎ௧ǡ௚௥௖  can be obtained simultaneously 
with the optimal solution rt,g of the SO formulation (5) - (8).  There are G reduced cost patterns corresponding to G 
groups.  The reduced cost of group g at time t provides information about how much the objective function increases 
if a small amount of departure of group g moves to depart at time t.  At the SO assignment, for each group, the basic 
variables at the time intervals they depart must have a reduced cost that is exactly zero, and the non basic variables at the other 
time intervals have a reduced cost greater than or equal to zero.  There are two scenarios for the reduced cost patterns:  
1) There is no overlap of the zero-reduced cost of any two groups.  In other words, every group has its reduced 
cost equal to zero at the time period of its departure, while the reduced costs of other groups at that time period are 
greater than zero or equal to zero at only one time interval.  Figure 2a,b,e are the illustrations for this case.  Consider 
group 2 in these figures.  The reduced cost of group 2 is equal to zero from time intervals 52 to 57 and greater than 
zero at the remaining time intervals.  The pattern rc2 are the reduced cost pattern of groups 2 at Figure 2e.  At these 
time intervals, 52 to 57, the reduced costs of two other groups are greater than zero.  It implies that if some 
commuters in group 2 decide to depart at time intervals other than 52 to 57, they will increase the total system cost.  
And if some commuters in group 1 or group 3 change to depart at time intervals 52 to 57, they also increase the total 
system cost.  The same arguments are used for the reduced cost patterns of group 1 and group 3.  In conclusion, this 
example has unique assignment of SO. 
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Figure 2  Unique or multiple solutions illustrated by reduced cost pattern 
Unique solution: a) departure rate ࢚࢘ǡࢍ, b) reduced cost ࢚࢘ǡࢍ࢘ࢉ , e) plot for these reduced cost patterns 
Multiple solutions: c) departure rate ࢚࢘ǡࢍ, d) reduced cost ࢚࢘ǡࢍ࢘ࢉ , f) plot for these reduced cost patterns 
2) There is an overlap of the zero-reduced cost of two groups.  If two groups have a time period in which their 
reduced costs are both equal to zero, they can freely exchange the departure rate with each other without increasing 
the total system cost.  Therefore the SO problem has multiple solutions.  Figure 2c,d,f, is an illustration of this case.  
Both group 1 and group 2, or pattern rc1 and rc2 respectively, in Figure 2f, have zero-reduced cost from time 52 to 
70.  This implies that from this period, these two groups can exchange their departure rate at any two time intervals 
without increasing the objective value.  For example, the assignment with r52,g1 = 1, r53,g1 = 2, r52,g2 = 2, r53,g2 = 1 
results the same objective value.  It is easy to see that in this case, the schedule delays of these two groups are equal: 
βg1 = βg2 or Jg1 = Jg2. 
t r 1 r 2 r 3 t rc 1 rc 2 rc 3 t r 1 r 2 r 3 t rc 1 rc 2 rc 3
50 0 0 0  0.2 0.13 1  0 0 0  0.16 0.16 0.86
51 0 0 0  0.12 0.06 0.89  0 0 0  0.08 0 08 0.75
52 0 3 0  0 05 0 0.79  0 3 0  0 0 0.64
53 0 3 0  0 04 0 0.75  3 0 0  0 0 0.61
54 0 3 0  0 03 0 0.71  3 0 0  0 0 0.58
55 0 3 0  0 02 0 0.67  3 0 0  0 0 0.55
56 0 3 0  0 01 0 0.63  3 0 0  0 0 0.52
57 3 0 0  0 0 0.59  3 0 0  0 0 0.49
58 3 0 0  0 0.01 0.56  3 0 0  0 0 0.46
59 3 0 0  0 0.02 0.53  3 0 0  0 0 0.43
60 3 0 0  0 0.03 0.5  0 3 0  0 0 0.4
61 3 0 0  0 0.04 0.47  3 0 0  0 0 0.37
62 3 0 0  0 0.05 0.44  3 0 0  0 0 0.34
63 3 0 0  0 0.06 0.41  0 3 0  0 0 0.31
64 3 0 0  0 0.07 0.38  3 0 0  0 0 0.28
65 3 0 0  0 0.08 0.35  3 0 0  0 0 0.25
66 3 0 0  0 0.09 0.32  3 0 0  0 0 0.22
67 3 0 0  0 0.1 0.29  0 3 0  0 0 0.19
68 3 0 0  0 0.11 0.26  3 0 0  0 0 0.16
69 3 0 0  0 0.12 0.23  3 0 0  0 0 0.13
70 3 0 0  0 0.13 0.2  3 0 0  0 0 0.1
71 3 0 0  0 0.08 0.1  0 3 0  0.05 0 0.05
72 0 0 3  0 0.03 0  0 0 3  0.1 0 0
73 0 0 3  0.1 0.08 0  0 0 3  0.2 0 05 0
74 0 0 3  0.2 0.13 0  0 0 3  0.3 0.1 0
75 0 0 3  0.3 0.18 0  0 0 3  0.4 0.15 0
76 0 0 3  0.4 0.23 0  0 0 3  0.5 0.2 0
77 0 0 3  0.5 0.28 0  0 0 3  0.6 0 25 0
78 0 0 3  0.6 0.33 0  0 0 3  0.7 0.3 0
79 0 0 0  0 85 0.53 0.15  0 0 0  0.81 0 36 0.01
80 0 0 0 80 1.1 0.73 0.3 80 0 0 0 80 1.06 0 56 0.16
a) b) c) d)
e) f)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
rc1
rc2
rc3
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
rc1
rc2
rc3
Time Time
Reduced cost Reduced cost
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In summary, one can determine the solution properties of the SO formulation based on the given data and the 
reduced cost patterns which can be computed easily from this formulation. 
b. Comparisons between the UE formulation and SO formulation 
This subsection compares the results of the two discrete heterogeneous commuter models: the UE model 
(Ramadurai et al, (2010)), and the SO model (formulation (5) to (8)). From the comparison, we have the following insights: 
-  First, there is no queue time in SO assignment. 
- The UE model has a unique equilibrium cost Cg* for each group.  The SO model has a unique objective value in 
terms of total system cost.  
- For departure rate vector (rt,g)t = 0,...,T, g = 1,...,G, both UE model and SO model can have a unique solution or 
multiple solutions.  The solution property of UE model depends on the ratio of β/α and γ/α, while the solution 
property of SO model depends on the absolute value of β and γ.  In the UE model, if two groups have same ratio 
βg/αg and γg/αg, which is βg1/αg1 = βg2/αg2, and γg1/αg1 = γg2/αg2 with g1, g2 {1,...,G}, they can depart at the same time 
without changing the equilibrium cost.  In SO model, if two groups have similar βg and γg, which is βg1 = βg2 and γg1 
= γg2, they can depart at the same time without changing the minimal objective value.  
In summary, the UE assignments are stable although the commuters have to pay the queue time cost.  The SO 
assignments can minimize the total system cost by eliminating the queue time but this assignment is unstable from a 
user point of view and hence cannot be used for policy making purposes.  In section 5, we will analyze the pricing 
strategies to ensure an obtained SO solution is also an SOE solution in which the total system cost is minimized and 
no commuter has an incentive to shift their departure time.  
5. Development of Optimal Toll Strategies 
The SO solution of problem (5) - (8) provides an assignment with minimal total system cost.  However, in order 
to develop a stable solution which the users are willing to follow, one has to find a toll pricing strategy to ensure the 
obtained SO solution is also an SOE solution.  The focus on this section is to find such a toll pricing strategy.  
Mathematically, we want to find a vector of 0,...,( )t t Tp   so that an optimal solution *, 0, , , 1, ,( )t g t T g Gr    of the LP 
formulation (5) - (8) is also a solution of the equilibrium problem with the toll price.  Such a vector 0,...,( )t t Tp   is 
called an optimal toll based on *
, 0, , , 1, ,( )t g t T g Gr   .  
Using the approach presented in Ramadurai et al (2010), we develop a complementarity formulation for the 
equilibrium problem with the toll price as follows: 
                      
* *
, , ,
0 [ ( )] 0,t g g t g t g g t g g t g tr TT e e t t TT C pD E Jd A        t
   
0,..., , 1,..., ,t T g G   
 (9) 
                     
0,
1
0 00 0,
G
g
g
r s
TT TT
s
 

d A  t
¦
 
(10) 
,
1
10 ,
G
t g
g
t t t
r s
TT TT TT
s
 


d A  
¦
1,..., ,t T   (11) 
                      
*
, ,
0 ( ) 0,t g t g g te e t t TTd A    t
                                                    
0,..., , 1,..., ,t T g G   
 (12) 
                      
*
,
0
0 0,
T
g t g g
t
C r N
 
d A  t¦
                                                               
1,..., .g G  
 (13) 
Let *
, 0, , , 1, ,( )t g t T g Gr    be an optimal solution of (5) - (8).  To find an optimal toll based on it, we look for 
0,...,( )t t Tp   such that there exists a nonnegative vector * 1,...,( )g g GC   together with *, 0, , , 1, ,( )t g t T g Gr   , TTt = 0 t = 
0,...,T, and *
,
max( ,0)  0, , ,  1, , ,t g ge t t t T g G      satisfying (9) - (13).  Therefore the following lemma 
holds readily. 
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Lemma 2.  Given an SO solution *
, 0, , , 1, ,( )t g t T g Gr   , if the following system 
* * *
,
( ),    0,..., , 1,..., ,  such that 0 and ,t g g g t g gp C t t t T g G r t tE       ! d  (14) 
* * *
,
( ),    0,..., , 1,..., ,  such that 0 and ,t g g g t g gp C t t t T g G r t tJ       ! !  (15) 
* * *
,
( ),   0,..., , 1,..., ,  such that 0 and ,t g g g t g gp C t t t T g G r t tE  d      d  (16) 
* * *
,
( ),   0,..., ; 1,..., , such that 0 and .t g g g t g gp C t t t T g G r t tJ  d      !  (17) 
0,  0, ,  and 0,  1, , ,t gp t T C g Gt  t   (18) 
is feasible, then for any feasible solution 0,..., 1, ,( )  and ( ) ,t t T g g Gp C  of the system (14) - (18),  0,...,( )t t Tp   is an 
optimal based on *
, 0, , , 1, ,( )t g t T g Gr   . 
Proof.  Let 0,  0, ,  and 0,  1, , ,t gp t T C g Gt  t   be a feasible solution of (14) - (18),
 
it suffices to verify 
that *
, 0, , , 1, ,( )t g t T g Gr   , TTt = 0 t = 0,...,T, *, max( ,0)   0, , ,  1, , ,t g ge t t t T g G      and gC satisfy the user 
equilibrium conditions (9) - (13).  Notice that *
,
1
,  0,...,
G
t g
g
r s t T
 
d   ¦ , therefore with TTt = 0 t = 0,...,T, equations 
(10) and  (11) are satisfied.  With TTt = 0 t = 0,...,T, equation (12) is equivalent to 
*
,
max( ,0)   0, , ,  1, , .t g ge t t t T g G       
Since 0,  1, , ,gC g Gt   and *,
0
,  1,..., ,
T
t g g
t
r N g G
 
   ¦  equation (13) holds.  Now we only need to verify (9).  
Notice that with TTt = 0 t = 0,...,T, and *, max( ,0)   0, , ,  1, , ,t g ge t t t T g G     equation (9) becomes 
* * *
,
0 ( ) 0,    0,..., , 1,..., , ,t g g g g t gr t t C p t T g G t tEd A    t    t  (19) 
* * *
,
0 ( ) 0,    0,..., ; 1,..., , .t g g g g t gr t t C p t T g G t tJd A    t      (20) 
Since , 0, ,  and ,  1, , ,t gp t T C g G   satisfy (14) - (17), it is clear that they satisfy (19) and (20) also.  This 
concludes the proof.                 
Define  
* *
, * *
( ),   if 
.
( ),   if 
g g g
t g
g g g
t t t t
c
t t t t
E
J
­  d°®  !°¯
 Then formulation (5) - (8) can be rewritten as follows: 
                                                                Minimize     
, ,
1 0
G T
t g t g
g t
c r
  
¦¦  (21) 
                                                                Subject to     
,
1
,
G
t g
g
r s
 
d¦
      
0,...,t T   (22) 
                                                                                     
,
0
,
T
t g g
t
r N
 
 ¦
   
1,...,g G  
 
(23) 
                                                                                     
,
0,t gr t
           
0,..., ,    1,...,t T g G    
 (24) 
The dual problem is given below: 
                                                                Maximize    
0 1
T G
t g g
t g
sp N C
  
¦ ¦  (25) 
                                                                Subject to    
,
,g t t gC p c d
  
1,..., ,g G  
 (26) 
                                                                                    
0,tp d
             
0,..., ,t T  (27) 
                                                                                    
 unrestricted.gC  (28) 
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The next theorem asserts that the optimal dual solution in fact provides us an optimal toll. 
Theorem 3.  Let  * * *, 0, , , 1, , 0,..., 1,...,( ) , ( ) , ( )t g t T g G t t T g g Gr p C     be an optimal primal dual solution of the linear 
program (5) - (8) and its dual program (25) - (28).  Then * 0,...,( )t t Tp   is an optimal toll based on *, 0, , , 1, ,( )t g t T g Gr    
with * 1,...,( )g g GC   being the equilibrium price of the UE problem with the toll price * 0,...,( )t t Tp   . 
Proof.  We first claim that * 0,  1,...,gC g Gt   .  Suppose for the sake of contradiction that *  such that 0gg C  . It 
follows that * *
,
0 ,  0,...,g t t gC p c t T  d   , which implies that *, 0,  0,...,t gr t T   , and hence *,
0
0
T
t g
t
r
 
 ¦ .  This 
contradicts the fact that *
,
0
0.
T
t g g
t
r N
 
 !¦  Next we verify that * *0,..., 1,...,( ) ,  and ( )t t T g g Gp C    satisfy (14) - (18).  Since 
* 0,  0,..., ,tp t Td    we have * 0,  0,..., .tp t T t    Therefore (18) is satisfied.  By complementary slackness, we 
have that if *
,
0,t gr !  then * * , .g t t gC p c   By the definition of , ,t gc  (14) and (15) are satisfied.  By dual feasibility 
(16) and (17) are also satisfied.  This concludes the proof.           
 
Theorem 3 confirms that the optimal toll always exists if the condition in Lemma 1 is satisfied.  Moreover, the 
optimal dual variable values provide an optimal toll.  Therefore, this theorem also provides us a way to find an 
optimal toll.  Notice that Theorem 3 does not guarantee that the solution of (9) - (13) with an optimal toll applied is 
always an SO solution.  This will be illustrated in the Section 6.  
Next, we analyze the possible of having multiple optimal toll schemes which can lead to the SOE.  Two 
necessary conditions of the optimal toll are taken into account.  The first necessary condition requires that the toll 
must be set so as the equilibrium within a group is satisfied.  The second necessary condition requires that the toll 
difference between two consecutive groups must be smooth enough to guarantee the equilibrium condition at the 
transition times between them.  
 
 
Figure 3  Toll scheme patterns in Condition 1: a) Unique SO solution b) Multiple SO solutions 
5.1. Condition 1:  
Given a SO assignment, the toll must be set such that the total of toll and schedule delay cost for each group is a constant.  
From (9), for each group g, if rt g > 0, then * *, ,[ ( )]t g g t g g t g gp C e e t tE J     .  It implies that toll pt must be set 
so that the total of toll and schedule delay cost for each group is a constant.  Figure 3 is an illustration for Condition 
1.  After obtaining the SO assignment as a solution of (5) - (8), we estimate and plot the SCD for each group.  Figure 
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3a is a case with the unique SO solution.  The groups depart in separate time periods with different slope of SCD.  
Figure 3b is an illustration for the multiple SO solutions.  There are some groups departing at the same period of 
time.  These groups have similar SCD penalty and their SCD patterns are parallel.  If the toll pt guarantees Condition 
1, the equilibrium condition for departures in each group is guaranteed. 
5.2. Condition 2:  
Given an SO assignment, the departure orders of groups are known.  This condition considers the equilibrium in 
the departure times of two consecutive groups (in terms of the order of departure) g1 and g2.  
Theorem 4.  Let *
, 0,..., ; 1,...,( )t g t T g Gr    be an SOE solution and 0,...,( )t t Tp   be an optimal toll vector based on 
*
, 0,..., ; 1,...,( )t g t T g Gr   .  If there exists 1 2{0,..., } and , {1,..., } such that t T g g G 
 
* *
1, 1 ,
* *
21, 2 1,
0 and 0,          , {1,..., }
,
0 and 0,    , {1,..., }
t g t g
t g t g
r r g g g G
r r g g g G 
­ !   z °® !   z °¯
  
then we have
* *
1 2 1 21
* *
2 1 1 21
1 21
,     if 1 min( ,t ), 
,      if max( , ), 
 ,  otherwise.
g g g gt t
g g g gt t
g gt t
p p t t
p p t t t
p p
E E
J J
J E



­ d  d  d°° d  d t®° d  d°¯
  
 
Proof.  We consider the three cases one by one.  
Case 1: * *1 21 min( , )g gt t t d  
The cost at time 
 and 1t t   is: * * * *1 1 1 2 2, 1 1, 2( ) ( 1)g g g gt g t gC r t t r t tE E      
Let H  be a small amount of departures such that * *
, 1 1, 20 min( , )t g t gr rH   .  Exchange H  departures at  and 1t t  , 
we have:  * * * * * *2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2, 1 1, 2( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )g g g g g g g gt g t gC r t t t t r t t t tH E HE H E HE             
  
* * * *
1 1 2 2 2 1, 1 1, 2( ) ( 1) ( )g g g g g gt g t gr t t r t tE E H E E         
By the optimality of *
, 0,..., ; 1,...,( )t g t T g Gr    we have: 2 1 2 1 2 1( ) 0g g g gC C H E E E Et   t  t  
From (9), we have * * *2 2 2, 2 0 ( )g g gt g tr t t p CE    t  
Moreover, * 1, 2 0t gr  !  implies that: * *2 2 2 1( 1)g g g tC t t pE      
21 gt tp p E  d  
From (9), we also have * * *1 1 11, 1 10 ( 1)g g gt g tr t t p CE      t  
Since * * *1 1 1, 1 0, ( )g g gt g tr t t p CE!     ,  
11 gt tp p E  t  
Case 2: * *1 2max( , )g gt t tt  
The cost at time 
 and 1t t   is: * * * *1 1 1 2 2, 1 1, 2( ) ( 1 )g g g gt g t gC r t t r t tJ J      
Let H  be a small amount of departures such that * *
, 1 1, 20 min( , )t g t gr rH   .  Exchange H  departures at  and 1t t  , 
we have:  * * * * * *2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2, 1 1, 2( ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( ) ( 1 ) ( )g g g g g g g gt g t gC r t t t t r t t t tH J HJ H J HJ             
  
* * * *
1 1 2 2 1 2, 1 1, 2( ) ( 1 ) ( )g g g g g gt g t gr t t r t tJ J H J J         
By the optimality of *
, 0,..., ; 1,...,( )t g t T g Gr   , we have 2 1 1 2 1 2( ) 0g g g gC C H J J J Jt   t  t  
From (9), we have * * *2 2 2, 2 0 ( )g g gt g tr t t p CJ    t  
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Moreover, * 1, 2 0t gr  !  implies that: * *2 2 2 1( 1 )g g g tC t t pJ      
21 gt tp p J  t  
From (9), we also have * * *1 1 11, 1 10 ( 1 )g g gt g tr t t p CJ      t  
Since * * *1 1 1, 1 0, ( )g g gt g tr t t p CJ!     ,  
11 gt tp p J  d
 
Case 3: In this case, we first claim that * *1 2g gt td .  We prove this claim by contradiction.  Assume , then 
we must have * *2 1,  1g gt t t td  d .  Therefore, the total cost at time interval  and 1t t  is 
* * * *
1 , 1 1 1 1, 2 2 2( ) ( 1 ).t g g g t g g gC r t t r t tE J      After exchanging a positive H
 
amount of flow between time 
interval 
 and 1t t  , the new cost becomes    
* * * * * *
2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2, 1 1, 2( ) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1 ) ( )g g g g g g g gt g t gC r t t t t r t t t tH E HE H J HJ             
     1 1 2 1g gC CHE HJ    .  Thus C1 is not optimal cost, which is a contradiction.  Therefore * *1 2g gt td .  Now, 
from (9), we have * * *2 2 2, 2 0 ( )g g gt g tr t t p CE    t  
Moreover, * 1, 2 0t gr  !  implies that: * *2 2 2 1( 1)g g g tC t t pE      
21 gt tp p E  t  
 
 
Figure 4  Toll requirements in condition 2:  a) Case A        b) Case B        c) Case C 
From (9), we also have * * *1 1 11, 1 10 ( 1 )g g gt g tr t t p CJ      t  
* *
1 2g gt t!
Kien Doan et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 17 (2011) 269–291 281
Since * * *1 1 1, 1 0, ( )g g gt g tr t t p CJ!     ,  
11 gt tp p J  t                  
Condition 2 guarantees that the toll change is smooth enough to satisfy the equilibrium at the transition time 
intervals between the two consecutive groups. 
Figure 4a illustrates Case A.  Figure 4b demonstrates Case B.  Figure 4c exemplifies Case C.  The difference 
between toll 1 and t tp p  must satisfy Theorem 4.  If the toll at time t  is too low (or the toll at time 1t   is too 
high), the total cost of group 2 at time t  will be less than the equilibrium cost of group 2.  (See the solid green line 
in Figure 4abc.)  Hence group 2 has an incentive to depart at time t  to seek for a better cost. 
If there is an overlap in departure time of two groups g1 and g2  (Figure 3b), 1 2 1 2 or g g g gE E J J  .  It is easy to 
see that the toll difference: 1 21 g gt tp p E E     or 1 21 g gt tp p J J    .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5  A heuristic procedure to find the optimal tolls and solution to the SOE problem 
In summary, the procedure to find a set of optimal tolls is shown in the flow chart of Figure 5.  Given input data, 
the primal-dual pair (21) - (28) is solved to obtain the SO assignment *
,t gr  as well as an optimal toll 
*
ˆ,...,( ) .t t t tp   In 
order to find other optimal tolls, a heuristic procedure based on the Conditions 1 and 2 is processed.  First, from the 
SO assignment *
,t gr , the schedule delay 
*
,t gSCD  is estimated.  Let tˆ  and t  be the first and the last departure time, 
respectively.  From *
,t gr , 
*
,t gSCD , and the obtained optimal toll 
*
0,...,( )t t Tp   , other tolls 0,...,( )it t Tp   can be determined 
by Condition 1, 2 with which an amount of toll value can be added to or subtracted from * 0,...,( )t t Tp    as long as the 
equilibrium of all departures is guaranteed.  In other words, after the toll is calibrated, without changing *
,t gr , if the 
Input data 
Obtain SO solution *
,t gr  
*
,t gr =
*
,
UE
t gr ? Yes 
Other tolls 0,...,( )it t Tp  that 
guarantees the minimal cost of 
each group 
Solve the primal-dual 
pair (21) - (28) 
No 
SCDt,g 
One optimal toll 
*
0,...,( )t t Tp    
Obtain SOE 
solution which is 
similar to SO 
solution 
Obtain optimal dual solution 
* *
0,..., 1,...,( ) , ( )t t T g g Gp C   
by Condition 1, 2
 
Obtain some UE solutions *
,
UE
t gr  
Solve UE formulation (9) - (13) 
*
,
UE
t gr is not SOE 
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total cost of each group is still minimal, the UE conditions are guaranteed.  The optimal toll can be input into the UE 
formulation (9) - (13) to test the equilibrium.  In fact, there may be multiple UE solutions.  One of them is the SOE 
which is the most efficient assignment in both user viewpoint and system viewpoint.  The numerical results in the 
next section will illustrate this finding. 
6. Numerical Results 
In this section, we present numerical results with the data shown in Table 1.  There are three groups with 
different value of Dg, E g, J g, tg*.  The goal is to find the optimal tolls and the SOE assignment. 
Table 1  Input data 
 
Using the SO formulation (5) - (8), we can find the SO assignment (shown in columns 2 - 4 of Table 2 and Table 
3). An optimal toll is found from the primal linear program (5) - (8) and its dual program (25) - (28) (shown in 
column 8 of Table 2). As proved in Theorem 3, we can end up with an optimal toll and an SOE assignment. 
Table 2  Solution of SO formulation, toll scheme, and total cost 
 
SCDg(t) = Eg(t*  t) if t* d t and SCDg(t) = Jg(t  t*) otherwise 
Costg(t) = SCDg(t) + Toll(t) 
 Moreover, in order to test the uses of the proposed formulations and obtain insights into the pricing strategies, 
we continue analyzing the numerical results.  The schedule delay and the total cost of each group are computed and 
Group D E J t* N s
1 0.1 0.08 0.25 70 45 3
2 0.11 0.07 0.2 65 15 3
3 0.12 0.11 0.15 75 21 3
r 1 r 2 r 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
52 0 0 0 1.44 0.91 2.53 0 1.44 0.91 2.53
53 0 0 0 1.36 0.84 2.42 0 1.36 0.84 2.42
54 0 3 0 1.28 0.77 2.31 0.07 1.35 0.84 2.38
55 0 3 0 1.2 0.7 2.2 0.14 1.34 0.84 2.34
56 0 3 0 1.12 0.63 2.09 0.21 1.33 0.84 2.3
57 0 3 0 1.04 0.56 1.98 0.28 1.32 0.84 2.26
58 0 3 0 0.96 0.49 1.87 0.35 1.31 0.84 2.22
59 3 0 0 0.88 0.42 1.76 0.43 1.31 0.85 2.19
60 3 0 0 0.8 0.35 1.65 0.51 1.31 0.86 2.16
61 3 0 0 0.72 0.28 1.54 0.59 1.31 0.87 2.13
62 3 0 0 0.64 0.21 1.43 0.67 1.31 0.88 2.1
63 3 0 0 0.56 0.14 1.32 0.75 1.31 0.89 2.07
64 3 0 0 0.48 0.07 1.21 0.83 1.31 0.9 2.04
65 3 0 0 0.4 0 1.1 0.91 1.31 0.91 2.01
66 3 0 0 0.32 0.2 0.99 0.99 1.31 1.19 1.98
67 3 0 0 0.24 0.4 0.88 1.07 1.31 1.47 1.95
68 3 0 0 0.16 0.6 0.77 1.15 1.31 1.75 1.92
69 3 0 0 0.08 0.8 0.66 1.23 1.31 2.03 1.89
70 3 0 0 0 1 0.55 1.31 1.31 2.31 1.86
71 3 0 0 0.25 1.2 0.44 1.06 1.31 2.26 1.5
72 3 0 0 0.5 1.4 0.33 0.81 1.31 2.21 1.14
73 3 0 0 0.75 1.6 0.22 0.56 1.31 2.16 0.78
74 0 0 3 1 1.8 0.11 0.67 1.67 2.47 0.78
75 0 0 3 1.25 2 0 0.78 2.03 2.78 0.78
76 0 0 3 1.5 2.2 0.15 0.63 2.13 2.83 0.78
77 0 0 3 1.75 2.4 0.3 0.48 2.23 2.88 0.78
78 0 0 3 2 2.6 0.45 0.33 2.33 2.93 0.78
79 0 0 3 2.25 2.8 0.6 0.18 2.43 2.98 0.78
80 0 0 3 2.5 3 0.75 0.03 2.53 3.03 0.78
81 0 0 0 2.75 3.2 0.9 0 2.75 3.2 0.9
82 0 0 0 3 3.4 1.05 0 3 3.4 1.05
Cost 1 Cost 2 Cost 3Toll p tt
Solution from SO formulation
SCD 1 SCD 2 SCD 3
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shown in columns 5 - 7 and columns 9 - 11 of Table 2.  It is easy to see that the cost of each group is minimal.  
Hence the user equilibrium conditions are satisfied. 
As a comparison, Table 3 presents the solution of the UE formulation without toll, which is obtained by using the 
formulation developed in Ramadurai et al (2010).  The solution is shown in columns 5 - 7 of Table 3.  Then, we 
solve the UE formulation with toll (equations (9) - (13)).  Two solutions from two formulations are shown in 
columns 8 - 10 and 11 - 13 of Table 3. The first solution 
 
is exactly equal to the solution 
 
of the SO 
formulation (5) - (8).  Thus, it is an SOE assignment.  The second solution is different from that of the SO 
formulation.  Therefore it is not an SOE assignment. 
Table 3  Solution of SO formulation, UE formulation without toll, and UE formulation with toll pt 
 
 
Table 4 illustrates the comparison in costs of the SO, UE without toll, SOE, and another UE with optimal toll.  
We see that the total system cost of the SO assignment is the smallest (36.87) since the departures pay just the 
schedule delay costs.  However, this ideal condition is unstable and it does not exist without proper toll strategy.  
The assignment from the UE formulation without toll is stable.  Nevertheless, the total system cost of the UE 
assignment is high (84.3) because the departures pay both travel time and schedule delay.  The SOE assignment is 
stable.  Although the total system cost of the SOE assignment is high (87.93), the toll revenue is also high (51.06).  
Hence the real cost of the system is just 87.93 – 51.06 = 36.87 which is equal to the total cost from the SO solution.  
Therefore the SOE assignment is efficient, stable, and fair for all users of the bottleneck.  Another UE solution with 
optimal toll (last three columns of Table 4) is not as efficient as SOE assignment because there is less toll revenue 
and individuals pay more schedule delay cost. 
*
,
UE
t gr
*
,t gr
r 1 r 2 r 3 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 1 r 2 r 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
54 0 3 0 0 6.75 0 0 3 0 0 3 0
55 0 3 0 0 8.25 0 0 3 0 0 3 0
56 0 3 0 13.50 0 0 0 3 0 0 3 0
57 0 3 0 15.00 0 0 0 3 0 0 2.81 0
58 0 3 0 7.93 0 0 0 3 0 2.81 0.19 0
59 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
60 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
61 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
62 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
63 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
64 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
65 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
66 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
67 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
68 3 0 0 0.86 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
69 3 0 0 0 0 6.33 3 0 0 3 0 0
70 3 0 0 0 0 1.33 3 0 0 2.88 0 0
71 3 0 0 0 0 1.33 3 0 0 3 0 0
72 3 0 0 0 0 1.33 3 0 0 3 0 0
73 3 0 0 0 0 1.33 3 0 0 0.32 0 2.68
74 0 0 3 0 0 1.33 0 0 3 0 0 2.69
75 0 0 3 0 0 1.33 0 0 3 0 0 2.61
76 0 0 3 0 0 1.33 0 0 3 0 0 2.61
77 0 0 3 0 0 1.33 0 0 3 0 0 2.61
78 0 0 3 0 0 1.33 0 0 3 0 0 2.61
79 0 0 3 0 0 1.33 0 0 3 0 0 2.61
80 0 0 3 0 0 1.33 0 0 3 0 0 2.61
81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Another solution from UE 
formulation with optimal toll p t 
Solution from UE formulation 
without toll
An SOE solution from UE 
formulation with optimal toll p t t
Solution from SO formulation
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Table 4  Comparison in costs of SO, UE, and SOE assignment 
 
In the previous section, we show that there are infinite optimal toll schemes.  By using the results from Condition 
1 and 2 (Subsection 5.1, 5.2), one can customize a toll scheme so as the equilibrium condition for all departure is 
guaranteed. Table 5 shows some optimal tolls which can lead to the same SOE solution.  The toll scheme in column 
2 is obtained from primal and dual pair (21) - (28).  The one in other columns can be deviated by adding or 
subtracting a small amount so that Condition 1 and 2 are guaranteed.  All of those tolls are optimal and we can use 
them to achieve the SOE condition.  
Table 5  Examples of optimal tolls 
 
In summary, the above numerical results demonstrate the applications of the proposed models.  First, the system 
optimal assignment for general heterogeneous commuter model can be solved efficiently by linear programming.  
r 1 r 2 r 3 r 1 r 2 r 3 r 1 r 2 r 3
1.25 0.82 0.75 1.31 0.84 0.78 1.31 0.84 0.78
Cost of each group at UE solution 
without toll Cost of each group at SOE solution 
Total cost of UE without toll Total cost of SOE 
Cost of each group at another UE 
solution with optimal toll 
Total cost of UE which is not SOE
87.93
Toll revenue = 49.67
84.3 87.93
Toll revenue = 51.06
SCD cost: 87.93-51.06=36.87
Total cost of SO
SO solution 
36.87
Cost of each group varies 
SCD cost: 87.93-49.67=38.26
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
52 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
53 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
54 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06
55 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.13
56 0.21 0.2 0.19 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.2
57 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.27
58 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.35 0.33 0.34
59 0.43 0.42 0.41 0.4 0.42 0.42 0.4 0.41
60 0.51 0.5 0.49 0.48 0.5 0.5 0.48 0.49
61 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.57
62 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.66 0.64 0.65
63 0.75 0.74 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.73
64 0.83 0.82 0.81 0.8 0.82 0.82 0.8 0.81
65 0.91 0.9 0.89 0.88 0.9 0.9 0.88 0.89
66 0.99 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97
67 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.06 1.06 1.04 1.05
68 1.15 1.14 1.13 1.12 1.14 1.14 1.12 1.13
69 1.23 1.22 1.21 1.2 1.22 1.22 1.2 1.21
70 1.31 1.3 1.29 1.28 1.3 1.3 1.28 1.29
71 1.06 1.05 1.04 1.03 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.04
72 0.81 0.8 0.79 0.78 0.8 0.8 0.78 0.79
73 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.54
74 0.67 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.66 0.63 0.64 0.64
75 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.75
76 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.6 0.62 0.6 0.6 0.6
77 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.45
78 0.33 0.32 0.31 0.3 0.32 0.3 0.3 0.3
79 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15
80 0.03 0.02 0.01 0 0.02 0 0 0
81 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
82 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
t Optimal Toll p t
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The optimal toll is also obtained from the primal and dual problems.  It is a very effective method to provide the 
proper toll strategy in congestion mitigation, which can be applied for all general heterogeneity cases.  The LCP user 
equilibrium formulation with toll can be used to find multiple equilibrium conditions.  One of them is SOE.  Final, 
multiple optimal toll schemes can be derived which indicate the flexibility of toll strategies to attain the SOE. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper focuses on the study of pricing strategy for the single bottleneck model with heterogeneous 
commuters in the discrete time setting.  It is rigorously shown that there is no queue time in the system optimal 
assignment.  While this was shown for the homogenous case and limited forms of heterogeneity previously in the 
continuous time setting, our work focused on the general heterogeneous case in the discrete time setting.  The result 
provides a foundation for developing an analytical formulation for the system optimal single bottleneck model.  The 
existence of a solution for the SO formulation is shown and the uniqueness properties are discussed.   
We formulate the user equilibrium conditions with toll as a linear complementarity problem.  Based on this linear 
complementarity formulation and the system optimal linear programming formulation, we apply the linear 
programming duality to provide a constructive proof of the existence of an optimal toll for the system optimal 
equilibrium assignment.  The insights into the multiple optimal toll strategies are obtained from the two necessary 
toll conditions.  Extensive numerical experiments are conducted to test all of the proposed formulations and to 
obtain insights into the proposed congestion pricing methods. 
8. Appendix 
8.1. Analogy between discrete-time and continuous-time models 
a) Continuous-time single bottleneck model (Hendrickson and Kocur, 1981;  Arnort et al, 1988, 1993, 1994;   
Laih, 1994;  Mun, 1999;  Ramadurai et al, 2007; etc):  
Let D(t) be the queue length, TT(t) be the travel time (or queuing time), s be the capacity, r(t) be the departure 
rate.  
Queue length: 
ˆ
ˆ( ) ( )
t
t
t
D r u du s t t  ³ , where tˆ  is the most recent time at which there was no queue.  
Travel time:                                     
ˆ
1 ˆ( ) ( )
t
t
t
t
D
TT r u du t t
s s
   ³  (29) 
 
b) Discrete-time single bottleneck model (Ramadurai et al, 2010):  
For simplicity, we just consider homogenous case with departure rate rt. Equation (1) and (2) are the recursive 
functions to estimate travel time. The “max” operator is to make sure that TTt ≥ 0. At t = 0, rt < s, there is no queue. 
First the queue is built up. Then it is cleared. The travel time function is as follows: 
0
0 max 0, 0
r s
TT
s
§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹  (30) 
0 1
1 '
' 0
1
max 0, ... ( 0)
t
t t
t t t
t
r s r s r sr s
TT TT r t
s s s s s

 
  § ·        ¨ ¸© ¹ ¦  (31) 
The travel time in equation (31) is similar to that in equation (29), with which we show that both continuous and 
discrete time models are identically represent the point queue at the single bottleneck. 
8.2. Proof for Theorem 1 
Let (rt)t = 0,...,T  be an SO assignment.  Assume for the sake of contradiction that the conclusion in Theorem 1 does 
not hold, then there exists a t such that TTt > 0.  Let tˆ  be the smallest t such that ˆ 0tTT ! , let t  be the smallest 
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ˆt tt
 such that 0tTT  .  Therefore it is clear that for all ˆ{ ,..., }t t t  we have another assignment whose total cost 
is smaller.  We define a new assignment (r’t)t = 0,...,T  as follows: 
                                                                           ' ,t tr r             ˆ 1t t d   (32) 
                                                                           ' ,tr s              ˆ 1t t t d d   (33) 
                                                                           
ˆ
ˆ' ( )
t
tt
t t
r r t t s
 
  ¦
 
(34) 
                                                                           
' ,t tr r 
            
1t t t   (35) 
With the new assignment, we can calculate the new travel time ܶ ௧ܶᇱ for t = 0,...,T. It follows that:   
                                                                           
0,t tTT TTc  
  
ˆ 1t t d 
 
 
                                                                           
0 ,t tTT TTc 
  
ˆ 1t t t d d 
 
 
By the definition of ˆ and t t , we have: 
ˆ
ˆ( 1)
t
t
t t
r s t t
 
d  ¦ . Therefore, 
ˆ
ˆ' ( )
t
tt
t t
r r t t s s
 
   d¦  and hence 
                                                              
0 and ,  1t t t tTT TT TT TT t tc c    t    
 Let W = rt / s. For each ˆ{ ,..., }t t t , we consider two possibilities of rt, i.e., rt > s and rt ≤ s, respectively.  
Notice that we must have tˆr s!  since tˆ  is the first time interval in ˆ{ ,..., }t t .  Moreover, tr s  since otherwise we 
have 0tTT ! . 
b) rt > s  
The rt departures will be assigned to more than one time intervals in the new assignment.  We will compare the 
total cost induced by these rt departures in the original assignment TC1 to that in the new assignment TC2.  Let xª º« »  
be ceiling of x, i.e., the smallest integer which is greater than or equal to x, and let x« »¬ ¼  be floor of x, i.e., the largest 
integer which is less than or equal to x.  We need to consider three sub-cases according to the preferred arrival time 
t*: * tt t TTt ª º« » , * tt t TT Wd  « »¬ ¼ , and *t tt TT t t TTW    « » ª º¬ ¼ « » .  
Case 1: * tt t TTt ª º« »  
In this sub-case, all of rt drivers in both the original and new assignment arrive no later than the preferred arrival 
time t* (Figure 6).  
If TTt-1 = 0, we have 
* *
1 2 2[ ( )] (1 ... 1 ) [ ( )] with (1 ... 1 )t t t t t t tTC rTT r t t TT s TT r t t TTD E D G E G W                (36) 
* * * *
2 2[ ] [ ( 1)] ... [ 1)] [ ]t tTC s t t s t t s t t TT s t t TTE E E E G            ª º ª º« » « »  (37) 
where 0 < G2 ≤ 1 is a scalar representing the departure at the last time interval. 
TC1 includes travel time cost and SCD cost of all rt departures departing at time interval t 
TC2 includes all SCD costs of each time interval in W period.  These numbers of departures are less than the capacity. 
Rewriting TC2 in (37), we have:  
* *
2 {[ ( )] [( ) ] {[ ( )] [( ) ( 1)]}t t t tTC s t t TT t TT t s t t TT t TT tE E              
* *
2... {[ ( )] [( ) ( 1)} {[ ( )] [( ) ]}t t t t t ts t t TT t TT t TT s t t TT t TT t TTE E G               ª º ª º« » « »  
*
2[ ( )](1 ... 1 ) [( ) ] [( ) ( 1)]t t ts t t TT s t TT t s t TT tE G E E              
2... [( ) ( 1)] [( ) ]t t t ts t TT t TT s t TT t TTE E G         ª º ª º« » « »  (38) 
Comparing this expression to (36):  
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* *
2[ ( )](1 ... 1 ) [ ( )]t t ts t t TT r t t TTE G E         since 2(1 ... 1 )G W     and ts rW   
[( ) ]t ts t TT t sTTE D    since E D  
[( ) ( 1)]t ts t TT t sTTE D     since E D  and [( ) ( 1)] 1t t tt TT t TT TT       
... 
[( ) ( 1)]t t ts t TT t TT sTTE D    ª º« »  since E D  and [( ) ( 1)]t t tt TT t TT TT    ª º« »  
2 2[( ) ]t t ts t TT t TT s TTE G D G   ª º« »  since E D  and [( ) ]t t tt TT t TT TT   ª º« »  (39) 
Thus TC2 < TC1 
 
Figure 6  rt > s with * tt t TTt ª º« »  for time interval ˆ{ ,..., }t t t  
a) TTt1 = 0 b) TTt1 > 0 
If TTt-1 > 0, then  
* *
1 1 2[ ( )] ( 1 ... 1 ) [ ( )]t t t tTC rTT r t t TT s TT r t t TTD E D G G E             (40) 
* * * *
2 1 1 1 2[ 1 ] [ ( 1 1)] ... [ ( 1)] [ ]t t t tTC s t t TT s t t TT s t t TT s t t TTE G E E E G                 ª º ª º ª º ª º« » « » « » « »  (41) 
where 0 ≤ G1 < 1 and 0 < G2 ≤ 1 are two scalars representing the departure at the first and the last time interval. 
By (2) we have (t + TTt  W) = (t – 1 + TTt1)  
Rewriting TC2 in (41), we have:  
* *
2 1 1 1{[ ( )] [( ) 1 ] {[ ( )] [( ) ( 1 1)]}t t t t t tTC s t t TT t TT t TT s t t TT t TT t TTE G E                 ª º ª º« » « »  
* *
2... {[ ( )] [( ) ( 1)} {[ ( )] [( ) ]}t t t t t ts t t TT t TT t TT s t t TT t TT t TTE E G               ª º ª º« » « »  
*
1 2 1 1 1[ ( )]( 1 ... 1 ) [( ) 1 ] [( ) ( 1 1)]t t t t ts t t TT s t TT t TT s t TT t TTE G G E G E                  ª º ª º« » « »  
2... [( ) ( 1)] [( ) ]t t t ts t TT t TT s t TT t TTE E G         ª º ª º« » « »  (42) 
Comparing this expression to (40):  
* *
1 2[ ( )]( 1 ... 1 ) [ ( )]t ts t t TT r t t TTE G G E          since 1 2( 1 ... 1 )G G W      and s rW   
1 1 1[( ) 1 ]t t ts t TT t TT s TTE G D G    ª º« »  since E D  and 1[( ) 1 ]t t tt TT t TT TT    dª º« »  because 
1 1
1
( ) 1  if 0 1
( ) 1  otherwise
t t t t
t t t
t TT t TT TT TT
t TT t TT TT
 

­       dª º° « »®     ª º° « »¯
 
1[( ) ( 1 1)]t t ts t TT t TT sTTE D     ª º« »  since E D  and 1[( ) ( 1 1)]t t tt TT t TT TT     ª º« »  
... (43) 
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[( ) ( 1)]t t ts t TT t TT sTTE D    ª º« »  since E D  and [( ) ( 1)]t t tt TT t TT TT    ª º« »  
2 2[( ) ]t t ts t TT t TT s TTE G D G   ª º« »  since E D  and [( ) ]t t tt TT t TT TT   ª º« »  
Thus TC2 < TC1 
Case 2:  * tt t TT Wd  « »¬ ¼  
In this sub-case, all of rt departures pay the late SCD cost.  The costs of original and new assignment are:  
* *
1 1 2 1 2[( ) ] ( 1 ... 1 ) [( ) ] with 1 ... 1t t t t tTC rTT r t TT t s TT r t TT tD J D G G J G G W                  (44) 
* * * *
2 1 1 1 2[ 1 ] [( 1 1) ] ... [( 1) ] [ ]t t t tTC s t TT t s t TT t s t TT t s t TT tJ G J J J G                 ª º ª º ª º ª º« » « » « » « »  
* *
1 1 1{[ 1 ( )] [( ) ]} {[( 1 1) ( )] [( ) ]}t t t t t ts t TT t TT t TT t s t TT t TT t TT tJ G J                 ª º ª º« » « »  
* *
2... {[( 1) ( )] [( ) ]} {[ ( )] [( ) ]}t t t t t ts t TT t TT t TT t s t TT t TT t TT tJ J G               ª º ª º« » « »       
*
1 2 1 1 1[( ) ]( 1 ... 1 ) [ 1 ( )] [( 1 1) ( )]t t t t ts t TT t s t TT t TT s t TT t TTJ G G J G J                  ª º ª º« » « »  
2... [( 1) ( )] [ ( )]t t t ts t TT t TT s t TT t TTJ J G         ª º ª º« » « »  (45) 
Comparing (45) to (44):  
* *
1 2[( ) ]( 1 ... 1 ) [( ) ]t t ts t TT t r t TT tJ G G J          since 1 2( 1 ... 1 )G G W      and ts rW   
1[ 1 ( )] 0t tt TT t TT    ª º« »  
1[( 1 1) ( )] 0t tt TT t TT     ª º« »  
... 
[( 2) ( )] 0t tt TT t TT    ª º« »  
2
2
2
0 if  is not integer[( 1) ( )] [( ) ( )]
0 otherwise
t
t t t t
s t TT
s t TT t TT s t TT t TT
s
J GJ J G J
­  °         ª º ª º ®« » « »  °¯
 
 If t + TTt is not integer, the left hand side = 
2
2 2 2 2{(1 )[ ( )] 1} [(1 )(1 ) 1] 0t ts t TT t TT s sJ G J G G J G           ª º« »  (46) 
Thus TC2 < TC1 
Case 3:  * tt TT t t TTW    ª º« »¬ ¼ « »  
In the original assignment, all r departures pay travel time cost and late SCD cost.  In the re-assignment, a portion 
of r departures pay late schedule delay and the others pay early schedule delay.  None of the users pay a travel time 
cost.  The argument for this sub-case is actually a combination of the two previous sub-cases. By the same technique 
of comparing the original cost and new cost, it is easy to find that TC1 > TC2 
c) rt ≤ s 
In this case, the travel time can be positive if and only if 1 ( ) /tTT r s s t    because 1 ( ) / 0t tTT TT r s s   t .  
A better cost assignment with non-travel time is then found. If r departures are reassigned to a period within one 
time interval (Figure 7a), it is easy to show that the schedule delay cost of two assignments are similar for all value 
of t*.  Moreover, the original assignment must pay travel time.  Thus the total cost of the first assignment is higher 
(TC1 > TC2).  If r departures arrive at two time intervals (Figure 7b), we separate the cost at each time interval and 
compare the total cost of two assignments.  
*With * tt t TTt ª º« »  
*
1 1 2[ ( )] ( )t t tTC rTT r t t TT s TTD E D G G       (47) 
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* *
2 1 2[ ] [ 1 ]t tTC s t t TT s t t TTE G E G      « » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼  
* *
1 2{[ ( )] [( ) ]} {[ ( )] [( ) 1 ]}t t t t t ts t t TT t TT t TT s t t TT t TT t TTE G E G              « » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼  
*
1 2 1 2[ ( )]( ) [( ) ] [( ) 1 ]t t t t ts t t TT s t TT t TT s t TT t TTE G G E G E G            « » « »¬ ¼ ¬ ¼  (48) 
Compare (48) to (47):  
* *
1 2[ ( )]( ) [ ( )]t ts t t TT r t t TTE G G E       since 1 2( )G G W   and s rW   
1 1[( ) ]t t ts t TT t TT s TTE G D G   « »¬ ¼  since E D  and ( )t t tt TT t TT TT   « »¬ ¼  
2 2[( ) 1t t ts t TT t TT s TTE G D G    « »¬ ¼  since E D  and [( ) 1 0t t tt TT t TT TT    d « »¬ ¼  (49) 
Thus TC2 < TC1 
 
Figure 7  rt ≤ s.  rt departures arrive (a) within one time interval, (b) at two continuous time intervals  
*With *t t TT Wd  « »¬ ¼  and * tt TT t t TTW    ª º« »¬ ¼ « » , using the same arguments, we obtain the identical 
results of TC2 < TC1 
Therefore, in the homogeneous commuter model, given an arbitrary assignment (rt)t=0,...,T, by re-assigning the 
departure time of drivers to the corresponding arrival time of original assignment, one can generate a better cost 
assignment without queue.  This proves that there is no travel time in the SO case.      
8.3. Proof for Theorem 2 
Let (rt g)t = 0,...,T;g = 1,...,G  be an SO assignment. Assume for the sake of contradiction that the conclusion in Theorem 
2 does not hold, then there exists a t such that TTt > 0.  Let tˆ  be the smallest t such that ˆ 0tTT ! , let t  be the 
smallest ˆt tt  such that 0tTT  .  Therefore it is clear that for all ˆ{ ,..., }t t t  we have another assignment whose 
total cost is smaller.  We define a new assignment (r’t,g)t = 0,...,T;g = 1,...,G  as follows: 
, ,
ˆ' , 1, 1,...,t g t gr r t t g G  d    (50) 
,
,
ˆ' ,  1, 1,...,t gt g
t
r
r s t t t g G
r
  d d   
 (51) 
,
,
ˆ
ˆ' ( ) ,  1,...,
t
t g
t g t
t t t
r
r r t t s g G
r  
     ¦  (52) 
290  Kien Doan et al. / Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences 17 (2011) 269–291
, ,
' , 1, 1,...,t g t gr r t t g G  t    (53) 
with 
,
, t t g
g
r r t

 ¦   
The rest of the proof for the heterogeneous case is very similar to that of the homogeneous case and hence is 
omitted.                  
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